http://www.ocregister.com/articles/chamberlain-sheriff-inmates-2012994-grand-jury 

Monday, April 7, 2008

O.C. sheriff's deputies shirked jail duty, grand jury transcripts show

Deputies shirked their duties and used inmates to police jail according to the transcripts from nine-month investigation.

By TONY SAAVEDRA , LARRY WELBORN and RACHANEE SRISAVASDI

Orange County Sheriff’s deputies at Theo Lacy Jail systematically shirked their duties, often sleeping in the guard station, playing video games and using jailhouse leaders to inflict corporal punishment on other inmates, a special grand jury found while looking into the 2006 death of inmate John Derek Chamberlain.

Thousands of pages of transcripts released Monday by the Superior Court showed a jail system out of control, with deputies failing to perform even cursory patrols of the jail barracks, instead relying on jail “shotcallers” – or inmate leaders – to enforce the rules. The use of inmates to control other inmates is against department policy, but deputies violated rule after rule in an effort to do as little work as possible, records show.

Also, jurors found high-ranking sheriff’s officials were untruthful in their testimony, offered forged documentation or no documents at all.

Jurors did not conclude that Chamberlain, 41, was killed as a result of deputies using inmates to inflict jailhouse justice. Chamberlain was tortured and slain by up to two dozen inmates who believed he was a child molester. Chamberlain, in fact, was awaiting trial on charges of possessing child pornography.

“This report established that the murder of John Derek Chamberlain need not have happened,” said a summary by District Attorney Tony Rackauckas. “It may have been prevented if existing policies and procedures had been followed and enforced. Our system of justice requires that those accused of crime be afforded due process and justice not only by the courts, but by those charged with maintaining them in custody.”

The release of grand jury transcripts today offers some answers into Chamberlain’s death and why Sheriff Jack Anderson recently released two top administrators and reassigned the captain at Theo Lacy.

The special grand jury was formed following an Orange County Register investigation into the Chamberlain attack, which found that a senior deputy was watching television 68-feet away while Chamberlain was punched, kicked and stomped to death. Rackauckas also was concerned that the sheriff’s department refused to let prosecutors take the lead in investigating the slaying, violating a 20-year protocol.

Documents released Monday show that grand jurors found during its nine-month probe that:

·         Sheriff’s employees testified falsely before the grand jury and violated the panel’s secrecy laws, comparing notes on their testimony and disclosing questions asked by jurors.

 

·         The sheriff’s department dragged its heels in complying with subpoenas, providing only partial information if any information at all.

 

·         Guards in charge of the barracks where Chamberlain was housed had not checked on the inmates for six hours prior to the slaying, although they recorded in the official log that they had made checks every 30-minutes. Sometimes the logs were prepared in advance of the shift. On the day Chamberlain died, the log was changed to reflect that he was not concerned for his safety.

 

·         Sheriff’s officials routinely disclosed inmate charges to the public at the time Chamberlain was assaulted. In fact, prior to his death, Chamberlain’s information had been given to as many as 10 anonymous callers.

Reports of rampant misconduct by deputies have long circulated among inmates and civil attorneys, but the transcripts offered the first official confirmation.

Inmates and one deputy testified that a jailer several times fired a pepper ball rifle into a Theo Lacy jail barracks, once because inmates did not make their beds fast enough. Other deputies testified that it was their aim to do as little work as possible, even if it meant denying medical treatment to inmates because they did not want to complete the paperwork.

Another jail employee told jurors that when he reported to work, he often found deputies asleep at their post, with blankets draped over the control panels to dim the lights. Civilian workers were told not to wake the napping deputies, who sometimes broke the backs of chairs so they would fully recline.

Deputies in the guard station also entertained themselves by watching “Cops” on television or full-length videos, such as “Black Hawk Down” or the “Star Wars” episodes. The televisions were supposed to be used to monitor programs being watched by inmates.

Deputies tried to hide their activities by warning each other with the code, “10-12,” whenever a supervisor was nearby, transcripts said.

On the day that Chamberlain was killed, veteran deputy Kevin Taylor, who initially told investigators he was watching a baseball game on television, was actually watching “Cops,” and exchanging 22 text messages on his telephone. Taylor refused to testify, claiming his 5th Amendment right not to incriminate himself.

Taylor was accused by one of the slaying suspects of instigating the attack by informing a “shot-caller” that Chamberlain was a child molester. Although Taylor was not criminally charged with doing so, jurors found that jailers routinely recruited shot-callers to beat up other inmates.

Often the punishment was getting punched in the torso for up to 30 seconds, inmates testified. Although jailhouse justice and inmate hierarchies exist in virtually every prison and jail, Orange County deputies had legitimized it, the grand jury found.

One deputy testified that he regularly had meetings with shot-callers and enlisted them to bring other inmates in line, knowing that the inmate would be physically attacked. In fact, the deputy testified he often witnessed the beating.

Shot-callers were later rewarded with extra food and better clothing, the report said.
In the aftermath of Chamberlain’s death, sheriff officials told the media and testified that it was the first in-jail homicide in 20 years and that the sheriff’s department had investigated all custodial deaths. Both were wrong. The district attorney’s office had investigated all deaths, but that of Chamberlain.

Documents presented to the grand jury by the sheriff’s department were altered to reflect that the sheriff’s department had done all the investigations.

Moreover, an internal affairs investigator repeatedly encouraged a deputy to disclose her secret testimony to the grand jury. That investigator was called before the grand jury, where he denied soliciting the testimony. Two days later, the investigator admitted he had lied. Deputies also lied about whether they had compared testimony pertaining to text messages received and sent by Taylor during his shift, the report said.

 

Register staff writers Ronald Campbell, Teri Sforza and Amy Taxin contributed to this report.

The Capistrano Dispatch

http://thecapistranodispatch.com/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=315&cntnt01dateformat=%25B%20%25d%2C%20%25Y&cntnt01returnid=15

April 7, 2008

Here is the Orange County District Attorney's Office summary of its investigation into the slaying of John Derek Chamberlain. Chamberlain was beaten to death in Orange County Jail by other inmates, while deputies watched television. The DA investigation, even without the full cooperation of the Orange County Sheriff's Department, found several repeated failures of department policy.

SANTA ANA - Orange County District Attorney Tony Rackauckas (OCDA) announced today the release of The Investigative Report From The 2007 Special Criminal Grand Jury Inquiry Into The Death Of John Derek Chamberlain and the following statement:

BACKGROUND OF JOHN DEREK CHAMBERLAIN

In the evening of September 14, 2006, John Derek Chamberlain was arrested on allegations of possession of child pornography and possession of an open container of alcohol. On October 3, 2006, Chamberlain was transferred to the Theo Lacy detention facility and assigned to "F" Barracks, West, a minimum security location. Two days later at 6:50 p.m., Orange County Sheriff's Department (OCSD) deputies were summoned to a location within the barracks where they observed Chamberlain lying on the floor. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. He had suffered numerous severe blunt force trauma injuries, including multiple rib fractures, which lead to respiratory failure and cardiac arrest.

CONFIGURATION OF THEO LACY "F' BARRACKS

"F" Barracks is divided into two equal halves, East and West, regularly staffed by two OCSD deputies and one Sheriff's Special Officer. The maximum occupancy of each half is 146 inmates. A guard station for the on-duty deputies is located between the halves. Each half of "F" Barracks has a central recreational day room. There are numerous "blind spots," or areas outside of open view.

REQUIRED DUTIES OF OCSD DEPUTIES AT THEO LACY
 
In order to fulfill their duties, the OCSD deputies are required to regularly patrol the interior of the facility every 30 minutes on foot and observe the activities of the inmates. The purpose of these floor checks is to inspect "blind spots," discourage assaults and verify that no inmates are injured or in need of help.

ACTUAL PRACTICE OF SOME OCSD DEPUTIES AT THEO LACY

In practice, some deputies regularly failed to perform their duties of securing the jail and the safety of its inmates. They seldom performed floor checks. The deputies instead largely remained in their guard station, where they were regularly seen watching television, full length movies, playing video games, browsing the Internet, chatting on-line, or sleeping with lights out. Even when awake at their guard station, some OCSD deputies would go as long as 30 minutes without even looking out the windows to scrutinize the barracks under their supervision.

When supervisors, with rankings such as sergeants or higher, walked through the facility, some deputies utilized a code called "10-12" to forewarn others of their approach. Some deputies made entries in the logs which could be interpreted that they had performed their regular patrols when in fact they had not.

INAPPROPRIATE USE OF "SHOT CALLERS"

The OCSD deputies at Theo Lacy substituted other methods than those prescribed by policy to control the inmates under their supervision. They routinely used inmates called "shot callers" to enforce discipline or inflict punishment on other prisoners. If deputies observed conduct on the part of an inmate which they considered a breach of the rules, they would summon the "shot callers" and instruct them to get these inmates "back in line." The deputies knew that if the inmate disregarded the "shot caller," the inmate would be assaulted or "taxed" by other inmates.

Some deputies developed methods, both positive and negative, to get the "shot callers" to do what they wanted. They gave "shot callers" extra privileges such as new uniforms, extra meals, extra hygiene products, and greater toleration or leeway if they broke the rules. Alternatively, the deputies would threaten "shot callers" with negative consequences, such as having their barracks "tossed" or their personal belongings and bedding thrown asunder if they failed to get the inmates under their authority "back in line."

 

The use of "shot callers" is against OCSD Policy which states, "Inmates will never be permitted to exercise control over other inmates," and "No inmate shall inflict punishment on another inmate." It is also against state law which prohibits investing inmates of penal institutions with the authority to exercise the right of punishment over other inmates.

DENIAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENTS

Some OCSD deputies at Theo Lacy denied medical treatment to inmates in order to avoid having to write required reports, or "cut paper." They encouraged "shot callers" to discourage injured or sick inmates from seeking or making further requests for medical attention.

USE OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT

There were unspecified reports that one Theo Lacy deputy inflicted unauthorized discipline and punishment on inmates using less than lethal force. This deputy reportedly failed to notify his supervisor or document the use of force as required by OCSD Policy. On multiple occasions, for example, a "pepper ball" rifle was fired against inmates of "F" Barracks against Policy. These were for minor transgressions such as inmates not returning to their bunks "fast enough," leaving their bunks against orders, or becoming too loud. In further violation of OCSD Policy, no means of decontamination was provided or allowed to inmates affected by the "pepper ball" rounds.

UNRESTRICTED INFORMATION OF INMATES

Within penal institutions, inmates facing charges related to the sexual assault or abuse of children are often targeted for violent assault by other inmates. Some inmates make concerted efforts to learn the nature of fellow inmates' pending charges, including using OCSD's public information resources. OCSD was repeatedly made aware that its public information resources were being exploited for the purpose of targeting and assaulting inmates with pending child assault or abuse charges.

Public Internet access to certain inmate information ended in July 2006 at the time of John Chamberlain's incarceration. Information concerning an inmate's pending charges, location of incarceration, and bail status remains available, however, to anonymous phone callers upon request. In the days preceding Chamberlain's murder, OCSD received and fulfilled five to 10 anonymous calls requesting information of Chamberlain's pending charges.

CHAMBERLAIN'S MURDER

During the hour from 5:50 p.m. to 6:50 p.m. on October 5, 2007, John Chamberlain was dragged by other inmates to a "blind spot" within the Theo Lacy "F" Barracks, where he was out of view of OCSD deputies in the guard station. He was beaten to death at that location by successive waves of inmates. Some of the inmates participating in the assaults made repeated trips back and forth from the bathroom to the scene of the assault carrying water to wash the crime scene. None were confronted or interrupted by on-duty OCSD deputies. The deputies remained in the guard station, one reportedly watching television.

No deputy had patrolled the floor of the "F" Barracks, West, where the murder had taken place for a period of at least five hours before Chamberlain's body was found. Nevertheless, the nearby work station log had the entries, "barracks secure," for 6:00 p.m. and "barracks secure, no problems," for 6:30 p.m. After Chamberlain's body was found at 6:50 p.m., OCSD personnel retroactively entered into the log that at 2:30 p.m. Chamberlain had told deputies that he had not been in fear of his life.

Although OCSD was alerted to the fact that the presence of a television in the guard station may constitute a distraction to deputies on duty and may have contributed to the circumstances leading to the murder of Chamberlain, the television was not removed until six months after the murder.

OCSD'S PREVENTION OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
Subsequent to the discovery of Chamberlain's body, OCSD personnel prevented the OCDA from conducting an independent homicide investigation into the murder of Chamberlain. This was in violation of existing County protocol and historical precedent. When the sitting 2006-2007 Grand Jury requested information on this protocol, there was evidence that one OCSD official provided it with inaccurate information regarding the investigation of previous custodial deaths.

OCSD'S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF PROTOCOL AND HISTORY TO THE GRAND JURY
At the request of the District Attorney, the Orange County Superior Court convened a 2007 Special Criminal Grand Jury to investigate the murder of John Chamberlain and the circumstances surrounding the OCSD's investigation of that murder. Some OCSD witnesses gave testimony that mischaracterized the protocol and history of custodial death investigations.

OCSD PERSONNEL'S VIOLATION OF SECRECY AND UNTRUTHFULNESS TO THE GRAND JURY 
 In addition, after testifying before the 2007 Special Criminal Grand Jury, some OCSD personnel violated the secrecy rules governing Grand Jury investigations by disclosing to other OCSD personnel the substance of their testimony, the nature of the questions they had been asked, and the evidence shown to them. These same individuals then knowingly testified falsely before the 2007 Special Criminal Grand Jury concerning their violations of Grand Jury rules.

OCSD'S DELAY OF THE GRAND JURY PROCESS

OCSD records subpoenaed by the Special Grand Jury were either not produced, produced in redacted form or produced by unqualified witnesses. This had the effect of substantially delaying the Grand Jury's progress.

PURPOSE AND PLAN TO PROPOSE REFORMS

This report establishes that the murder of John Chamberlain may have been prevented if existing policies and procedures had been followed and enforced. Our system of justice requires that those accused of crime be afforded due process and justice not only by the court, but by those charged with maintaining them in custody.

The Office of Internal Review (OIR) and an impartial civilian monitor will help monitor and oversee the investigation and evaluation of complaints involving the OCSD.
 

This Report is merely a beginning to open an informed dialogue over how the County may avoid another such death in the future. Over the next several months, the OCDA will facilitate this dialogue and work with concerned parties to develop additional reforms.

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